The mobile-health system, also known as the wireless body area network for remote patient monitoring, is a system used to remotely monitor the human body's health status parameters in real time. The generalized signcryption can realize encryption, signature, and signcryption with only one key pair and one algorithm. To address the communication security requirement for the mobile-health system, Zhang et al. recently proposed a lightweight secure data transmission protocol for the mobile-health system, which uses a certificateless generalized signcryption scheme. However, Zhang et al.'s certificateless generalized signcryption scheme is insecure. In this article, we propose an improved certificateless generalized signcryption scheme and then give a rigorous security proof of it. The confidentiality of our improved scheme can be reduced to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and the unforgeability, the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem. Performance evaluation shows that our scheme has only slightly increased computational and communicational costs compared with the original scheme, but it is more efficient than other certificateless generalized signcryption schemes existing at present. What is more, it is also an efficient scheme compared with those ones protecting the mobile-health system. Based on our scheme, the same lightweight secure data transmission protocol for the mobilehealth system can also be constructed, just like the one based on the original scheme.
Introduction
With the rapid development of the micro-electromechanical system (MEMS), integrated circuit, and wireless communication technology, the mobile-health (M-Health) system has become a research hotspot. The M-Health system, also referred to as the wireless body area network (WBAN) 1 for remote patient monitoring, is a system where many low-power, intelligent, and miniaturized sensors are worn by or implanted in a human body to monitor his or her health status. These sensors collect personal health information (PHI) such as breathing rate, heart rate, and blood pressure and transmit them wirelessly to a controller like a mobile phone or a similar device. Then, the controller will send the PHI data to a remote health server, which will be processed by physicians in a timely manner. The general architecture of an M-Health system is depicted in Figure 1 . The communication between the controller and the health server can be done via a cellular network or the Internet. 2 In 2017, Zhang et al. 3 proposed a lightweight secure data transmission protocol to protect the communication between the controller and the health server based on the cellular network. To alleviate the traffic overload problem in the cellular network, they adopted the Device-to-Device (D2D) communication technology 4 which has attracted great attention in the literature recently. The D2D communication technology allows direct communication between user equipment (like mobile phones) with physical proximity to extend the battery lifetime, enhance users' throughput, and improve resource utilization. 4 Zhang et al.'s protocol has the following advantages.
(1) Data confidentiality and integrity: Data confidentiality means that the PHI data are encrypted, and the integrity means that if the PHI data are altered during the communication, then it can be discovered by the recipient. (2) Mutual authentication: It means that the M-Health client and the physician can authenticate each other to guarantee that they are communicating with the real peer. (3) Anonymity: The physician only needs to know the bio-information of the M-Health client, whereas all other private information, such as name, must be kept secret. 5 In Zhang et al.'s scheme, an M-Health client uses a pseudo identity to achieve anonymity in communication. (4) Unlinkability: Whether two communications are initiated by the same M-Health client is undecidable. (5) Forward security: In Zhang et al.'s scheme, a symmetric session key is introduced, and it is updated by a hash function in each session. If the current session key is exposed, the previous session key will still be secure. (6) Contextual privacy: 6 It means that if an adversary can link an MHealth client with a specific physician, then he or she may deduce the patient's disease. In Zhang et al.'s scheme, the attackers or legitimate users in the system do not have the ability to link the origin and the destination of the data if they do not collude. (7) Lightweight: The controller is a device with limited computation and storage capabilities, so the protocol must be lightweight. Zhang et al.'s scheme does not use time-consuming computations like bilinear pairings, 6 and its ciphertext size is also short.
Zhang et al.'s protocol is based on the certificateless generalized signcryption (CLGSC) technology. 7 Signcryption 8 can perform encryption and signature in a single logic step with the costs of computation and communication being far lower than the sum of those of encryption and signature. Generalized signcryption 9 is a natural extension of signcryption, which can realize encryption, signature, and signcryption in a single logic step. In this way, people only need to hold one key pair and use one algorithm to achieve encryption, signature, and signcryption functions, and with lower cost of key management and less storage space. Certificateless cryptosystem 10 can avoid the private key escrow problem in the identity-based cryptosystem 11 and reduce the high cost of public key management in the public key infrastructure (PKI)-based public key cryptosystem. 12 Zhang et al. gave the proof of their CLGSC scheme. Based on the scheme, they proposed a lightweight and robust security-aware D2D-assist data transmission protocol for the M-Health system. However, Zhou 13 pointed out that their CLGSC scheme is not secure. In this article, we propose an improved scheme to remedy the weaknesses of their scheme and prove the security of ours. The confidentiality of our improved scheme can be reduced to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem and the unforgeability, the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (EC-DL) problem. Efficiency analysis shows that our scheme increases only a little amount of computational and communicational costs compared with the original scheme, but it is more efficient than other CLGSC schemes there are at present. What is more, it is also an efficient scheme compared with those ones protecting the M-Health system. Based on our improved scheme, the same lightweight secure data transmission protocol for the In 2011, Kumar et al. 18 proposed a protocol to protect the beyond-BAN communication of the M-Health system. Their model is to allow the medical service providers (such as physicians or nurses) to access the controller to get the PHI data. Subsequent works include the studies by Li and Hong and Liu et al. 19, 20 But in these schemes, it requires that the medical service providers initiatively visit the controller, so it is not applicable to the emergency scenario.
In 2013, Yeh et al. 21 proposed an anonymous authentication protocol for WBAN to protect the beyond-BAN communication. However, their protocol, based on the traditional public key cryptosystem, has high complicated certificate management cost. In 2014, Liu et al. 5 proposed two certificateless remote anonymous authentication protocols for WBAN to protect the beyond-BAN communication. However, Zhao 22 pointed out that Liu et al.'s 5 first protocol cannot provide anonymity and that their second protocol is vulnerable to the stolen verifier-table attack. Then, they proposed a new protocol using the PKI-based public key cryptosystem. Later, Wang and Zhang 23 pointed out that Zhao's 22 protocol cannot provide real anonymity and then they proposed a new protocol using the identity-based cryptosystem. Unfortunately, Omala et al. 24 pointed out that in Wang and Zhang's 23 protocol, the medical service provider can impersonate an MHealth client. Furthermore, they proposed a new protocol using the certificateless cryptosystem. In recent years, remote anonymous authentication in M-Health has been a research hotspot, on which many research results have been obtained, including PKI-based protocols, 25, 26 identity-based protocols, 27, 28 and certificateless protocols. 29, 30 All these remote anonymous authentication protocols have one common characteristic, which is that they require one or more interactions between the controller and the health server.
Regarding non-interactive protocols, Tan et al. 31 proposed a scheme to protect the beyond-BAN communication of the M-Health system in 2008. They used a lightweight identity-based encryption scheme to achieve their goal. However, this scheme does not consider the authentication problem and has the private key escrow problem. In 2009, Lin et al. 6 proposed a protocol that can achieve data confidentiality and contextual privacy and can resist replaying attacks and forging attacks. However, their scheme is also based on the identity-based cryptosystem, so it still has the private key escrow problem. In 2012, Huang et al. 32 improved Tan et al.'s 31 scheme, but their protocol is still in the identity-based setting. In 2014 and 2015, Wang et al. proposed a ciphertext-policy attributebased ring signcryption 33 and a key-policy attributebased ring signcryption 34 to protect the beyond-BAN communication of the M-Health system, respectively. The ring signature technology can maintain M-Health clients' anonymity unconditionally, and the attributebased encryption technology can provide fine-grained access control for medical service providers. In 2016, Zhou et al. 35 proposed an identity-based generalized ring signcryption scheme to protect the beyond-BAN communication. However, the above three schemes all have high computational costs and communication overhead. In 2016, Omala et al. 36 proposed a certificateless signcryption scheme, but it does not support anonymity. In 2017, Zhang et al. 3 proposed an efficient CLGSC scheme, but Zhou 13 pointed out that it is not secure.
Regarding generalized signcryption, Han et al. 9 proposed the first generalized signcryption scheme to save storage space and simplify key management in 2006. Later, Han and Gui 37 proposed a multi-receiver generalized signcryption scheme and applied it to wireless multicast communication in 2009. Wang et al. 38 improved Han et al.'s scheme 9 and gave a formal definition and security model of generalized signcryption in the PKI setting in 2010. Later, Yu et al. 39 proposed an identity-based generalized signcryption scheme and a corresponding security model in the same year. Kushwah and Lal 40 simplified the security model in scheme [39] and proposed a more efficient identitybased generalized signcryption scheme in 2011. Zhou et al. 7 proposed a CLGSC scheme that can resist the malicious-but-passive KGC (key generation center) attack 41 in 2014. Wei et al. 42 proposed an identity-based generalized signcryption scheme in the standard model and applied it to big data security in 2015. Zhou 43 pointed out in the same year that scheme [37] is insecure under the confidentiality attack. Later, Han and Lu 44 proposed an attribute-based generalized signcryption scheme in the standard model and applied it to online social network security. Zhou and colleagues 35, 45 extended generalized signcryption to generalized ring signcryption and generalized proxy signcryption and proposed a concrete identity-based scheme, respectively, in 2016. Zhang et al. 3 proposed a lightweight CLGSC scheme and applied it to the M-Health system in 2017. Zhou et al. 46 proposed in the same year a certificateless key-insulated generalized signcryption scheme and applied it to cloud storage. Zhou 13 pointed out that scheme [3] is insecure in 2018.
Preliminaries
In the following, we will give some complexity assumptions used in the proofs of our scheme.
1. EC-DL Problem: Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field F p where p is a prime number, and let G be an additive group of prime order q on E(F p ). Given (P, aP) 2 G 2 for unknown randomly chosen a 2 Z 
Formal definition and security model of CLGSC

Formal definition
A CLGSC scheme consists of the following six algorithms. 
Security model
There are two types of attackers in a CLGSC scheme. 10 Type I attacker A I does not know the master private key, but he or she can replace anyone's public key, which models the kind of attacker other than the KGC. The type II attacker A II knows the master private key but he or she cannot replace anyone's public key, which models the honest-but-curious KGC attacker. It is assumed that this type of KGC attacker produces the system parameters honestly according to the setup algorithm of the scheme. In 2007, Au et al. 41 introduced a new type of KGC attack, named malicious-but-passive KGC attack. The malicious-but-passive KGC may imbed some trapdoors in the system parameters in the setup stage so as to attack the system more easily in the later stage. Such type of KGC attack is taken into account in our security model. In addition, in our security model in the signcryption mode, the insider attacks are also considered, which were first introduced by An et al. 47 in 2002. The insider attacks include the sender's attack and the receiver's attack. The sender may damage the confidentiality of the scheme and the receiver may damage its unforgeability. In fact, Zhang et al.'s 3 security model takes into account all the above types of attacks, so does our security model.
The security of a CLGSC scheme must satisfy confidentiality under Type I and Type II attacks (in the encryption and signcryption modes), and unforgeability under Type I and Type II attacks (in the signature and signcryption modes).
There are six oracles which can be accessed by the adversaries as follows:
Partial-private-key queries. A submits an identity ID. C calls the Partial-Key-Gen algorithm to produce a partial private key D ID and returns D ID to A. Public-Key queries. A submits an identity ID. C computes the corresponding public key PK ID and sends it to A. Private-Key queries. A submits an identity ID. C computes the corresponding private key S ID and sends it to A. Public-Key-Replacement queries. A submits an identity ID and a new public key PK 0 ID . C replaces the current public key PK ID with the new key PK 0 ID . CLGSC queries. A submits two identities ID A and ID B , and a message m. C calls the CLGSC algorithm and returns the results s to A.
If ID A 0 s public key has been replaced, we require A to supply ID A 0 s secret value x A to make C produce correct results.
UN-CLGSC queries. A submits two identities ID A and ID B , and a ciphertext s. C calls the UN-CLGSC algorithm and returns the results to A.
If ID B
0 s public key has been replaced, we require A to supply ID B 0 s secret value x B to make C produce correct results. 
Note. In the above Challenge stage, the sender's identity ID Ã A can be null. In this case, algorithm runs in encryption mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the encryption and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Definition 2 (Type II confidentiality, encryption, and signcryption modes). A CLGSC scheme is said to be IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II secure if no PPT adversary A II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game:
1. Setup. Given a security parameter 1 k , A II runs the setup algorithm to produce the system's parameters Params and a master private key s. Then he or she gives Params and s to C. A can be null. In this case, algorithm runs in encryption mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the encryption and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above. 
A II
0 s advantage is its probability of victory.
Note. In the above Forgery stage, ID Ã B can be null. In this case, algorithm runs in signature mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the signature and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Zhang et al.'s communication model and scheme and Zhou's security analysis
The communication model Figure 2 , which consists of three entities: network manager (NM), M-Health clients, and medical service providers (such as physicians). The NM is the manager of the system whose duty is to initialize the system and generate partial private key for the registered users. Suppose that at session t, the M-Health client S wants to transmit his or her PHI data to the physician H and that those clients C i1 , C i2 , . . . , C in form the D2D link. Through C ij (j = 1, 2, . . . , n), the PHI data can be transmitted to the NM. Then, the NM delivers the PHI data to the physician H.
Zhang et al.'s communication model is depicted in
To achieve the security goal, the M-Health client first registers his or her pseudo identity S with the NM to achieve anonymity and the physician registers his or her real identity H. The NM also registers his or her real identity N. Then, S and H negotiate a symmetric key K t through a secure key agreement protocol. At the next session, K t is updated to K t + 1 using a secure hash function to achieve forward security. To begin a transmission, S signcrypts the PHI data m to get m S using S 0 s full private key, H 0 s public key, and the session key K t . S encrypts the identity S with H 0 s public key to get e If it is valid, he or she decrypts e S H to get the pseudo identity S. Then, he or she un-signcrypts the m S using his or her full private key and S 0 s public key. If it is valid, H will provide corresponding medical services.
In the above process of encryption, signature, and signcryption, we only need a generalized signcryption scheme to achieve the goal.
Zhang et al.'s original scheme
Setup: Given a security parameter 1 k , the KGC selects two primes p and q which satisfy the condition qj(p À 1) and a secure elliptic curve E(F p ). Let G be an cyclic group of order q on E(F p ), and P be a generator of G. The KGC randomly selects s 2 Z Ã q as the master private key and sets P pub = sP as the master public key. The KGC defines three hash functions:
n , where n is the bit length of a message. In addition, the KGC defines a special function f. If the identity ID is null, then f (ID) = 0; else, f (ID) = 1. The system public parameters are fp, q, E(F p ), G, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , f g. Key-Generation: 1. A user ID i randomly selects x i 2 Z Ã q as his or her secret value and computes his or her partial public key as X i = x i Á P. 2. The user sends (ID i , X i ) to the KGC. 3. The KGC randomly selects y i 2 Z Ã q and computes Y i = y i Á P, z i = y i + s Á H 1 (ID i , Y i , X i , P pub ). z i is sent to the user secretly. z i can be checked by equation f 2 , h 2 , c) as the ciphertext. UN-CLGSC: Given a generalized signcryption ciphertext s = (F 1 , f 2 , h 2 , c) . The verifier ID B does the following:
If it does, the verifier accepts it.
Cryptanalysis of the above scheme
Insider attack (signcryption mode): Zhou 13 gave two attacks to scheme [3] , which are as follows. 
. With r Ã , he or she can compute h In addition, after computing
, the attacker can also do the following to attack the confidentiality of the scheme. The attacker selects another identity ID 
An improved CLGSC scheme
The CLGSC algorithm of Zhang et al.'s scheme uses only one ephemeral variable, so the ephemeral variable can be calculated by an inside attacker. However, our improved scheme uses two ephemeral variables in the CLGSC algorithm. The details are as follows. In addition, to prevent some potential attacks, we incorporate many elements into the calculation of hash functions:
Setup: Given a security parameter 1 k , the KGC selects two primes p and q which satisfy the condition qj(p À 1) and a secure elliptic curve E(F p ). Let G be an cyclic group of order q on E(F p ), and P be a generator of G. The KGC randomly selects s 2 Z Ã q as the master private key and sets P pub = sP as the master public key. The KGC defines five hash functions:
, where m represents the bit length of a message. In addition, the KGC defines a special function f. If the identity ID is null then f (ID) = 0; else, f (ID) = 1. The system public parameters are fp, q, E(F p ),
User-Key-Gen: A user ID randomly selects x ID 2 Z Ã q as his or her secret value and computes his or her public key as X ID = x ID Á P. Partial-Key-Gen: Given a user's identity ID, the KGC randomly selects y ID 2 Z Ã q and computes Y ID = y ID Á P, z ID = y ID + s Á H 1 (ID, Y ID , P pub )modq. KGC broadcasts Y ID and sends z ID to the user secretly. z ID can be checked by equation z ID Á P = Y ID + H 1 (ID, Y ID , P pub ) Á P pub by the user. Private-Key-Gen: The user ID sets his or her full private key as (x ID , z ID ). CLGSC: Let ID A be the sender, ID B be the receiver, and m be the message. ID A computes f (ID A ) and f (ID B ). He or she randomly chooses r 1 , r 2 2 Z Ã q and computes
Then, he or she computes
This algorithm can be run in three modes. We add a tag in the ciphertext: 
and then computes Note: Based on the above CLGSC scheme, a lightweight secure data transmission protocol for the MHealth system can also be constructed, just like the one based on Zhang et al.'s scheme. 3 We suggest the readers refer to scheme [3] for a more detailed description of the protocol.
Security and efficiency analyses
In this section, we analyze the security and efficiency of our improved scheme.
Confidentiality
Theorem 1 (Type I confidentiality). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary A I with a nonnegligible advantage e against the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-I security of the scheme running in the encryption or signcryption mode in time t and performing at most q H i H i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) queries, q pÀpÀk partial-private-key queries, q pÀk private-key queries, q CLGSC CLGSC queries, and q UnÀCLGSC Un-CLGSC queries, then the CDH problem can be solved with probability
in time t 0 \t + (5 Á q CLGSC + 7 Á q UnÀCLGSC ) Á t m , where t m denotes the time for a scalar multiplication on G.
Proof. Suppose that challenger C is given (P, aP, bP) 2 G 3 for random a, b 2 Z Ã q . C does not know the values of a and b and is asked to compute abP. To utilize adversary A I , challenger C will simulate all the oracles as in the Find stage:
Setup: C sets P pub = aP. Other public parameters are produced normally. C gives the system public parameters Params = fp, q, E(F p ), G, P, P pub , Note: If ID 0 s public key has been replaced by A I , then A I is not allowed to query this oracle. CLGSC query: A I provides two identities fID A , ID B g (one of them may be null) and a message m. If ID A is null, then it is equal to an encryption oracle, which just needs public parameters. Otherwise, we consider two cases:
1. ID A 6 ¼ ID l . C runs the CLGSC algorithm as normal because C can get the private key C randomly chooses r 1 , t 2 , h 3 2 Z Ã q and computes
, and f 2 = x ID l Á h 2 + r 1 Á h 4 + t 2 mod q. Then, he or she computes
If there is a collision, C re-chooses r 1 , t 2 , h 3 2 Z Ã q and repeats the process again. Finally, C returns s = (F 1 , F 2 , c) and Y ID l to A I .
Note: If ID A 0 s public key has been replaced by A I , then A I must supply the corresponding secret value.
Un-CLGSC query: A I provides two identities fID A , ID B g (one of them may be null) and a ciphertext s. If ID B is null, it is equal to a signature verification oracle, which just needs public parameters. Otherwise, we consider two cases: 1. ID B 6 ¼ ID l . C runs the Un-CLGSC algorithm as normal because C can get the private key (x ID B , z ID B ) of ID B . 2. ID B = ID l . C does not know the partial private key of ID B . C starts from the first item of list L 5 to compute mjjf 2 = h 5 È c and verifies whether the equation 
The required values of the above computations can be obtained by querying associated oracles. C inserts the tuple (F Finally, A I must give his or her guess h 0 . A I cannot discover that s Ã is not a valid ciphertext unless he or she asks H 5 oracle with the tuple (F
If this happens, the CDH problem can be solved by computing abP = (h
Now we assess the probability of success. In the Challenge stage, the probability of ID
In both the partial-private-key and private-key queries, the probability of C querying with ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the UN-CLGSC stage, the probability of C refuging the right ciphertext is less than q UnÀCLGSC =2
k . In terms of time complexity, CLGSC and Un-CLGSC queries need 5 and 7 t m computations, respectively.
Note: A I is allowed to query the full private key S Ã ID A in the Find and the Guess stages, considering the inside attacker ID Ã A may damage the security of the scheme.
Theorem 2 (Type II confidentiality). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary A II with a nonnegligible advantage e against the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II security of the scheme running in the encryption or signcryption mode in time t and performing at most q H i H i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) queries, q pÀk private-key queries, q CLGSC CLGSC queries, and q UnÀCLGSC Un-CLGSC queries, then the CDH problem can be solved with probability e 0 ø e Á 1=q
where t m denotes the time for a scalar multiplication on G.
Proof. Suppose that challenger C is given (P, aP, bP) 2 G 3 for random a, b 2 Z Ã q . C does not know the values of a and b and is asked to compute abP. To utilize adversary A II , challenger C will simulate all the oracles as in the Find stage:
Setup: A II randomly selects s 2 Z Ã q as the master private key and computes the master public key as P pub = sP. Other public parameters are produced normally. A II gives the system public parameters Params =fp, q, E(F p ), G, P, P pub , 
not exist in list L k 1 , then C makes the public-key query first). Then, C returns (x ID , z ID ) and Y ID to A II . 2. ID = ID l . C aborts. CLGSC query: A II provides two identities fID A , ID B g (one of them may be null) and a message m. If ID A is null, then it is equal to an encryption oracle, which just needs public parameters. Otherwise, we consider two cases: 1. ID A 6 ¼ ID l . C runs the CLGSC algorithm as normal because C can get the full private key
and
Y ID B from corresponding lists.
C randomly chooses r 1 , t 2 , h 2 2 Z Ã q and computes 
. If this happens, C outputs V Ã 1 = abP as the solution to the CDH problem. Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Challenge stage, the probability of ID Ã B = ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the private-key query, the probability of C querying with ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the UN-CLGSC stage, the probability of C refuging the right ciphertext is less than q UnÀCLGSC =2
Note 1: In order to resist the malicious-but-passive KGC attack, we must let adversary A II produce the system parameters Params and master private key s in the Setup stage.
Note 2: A II is allowed to query the full private key S 
Unforgeability
Theorem 3 (Type I unforgeability). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary A I with a nonnegligible advantage e against the EUF-CLGSC-CMA-I security of the scheme running in the signature or signcryption mode in time t and performing at most q H i H i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) queries, q pÀpÀk partial-privatekey queries, q pÀk private-key queries, q CLGSC CLGSC queries, and q UnÀCLGSC Un-CLGSC queries, then the EC-DL problem can be solved with probability e 0 ø eÁ
Proof. Suppose that challenger C is given (P, aP) 2 G 
is not the output of a CLGSC query, according to the multiple forking lemma, 48 we can obtain four valid
3 ), and
3 ), where h 
are four different hash values corresponding to the H 3 oracle. Because f
+ r Ã 2 mod q, we can obtain the following four equations: f
1 ) À1 = a. Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Forgery stage, the probability of ID Ã A = ID l is 1=q H 1 . In both the partial-private-key and private-key queries, the probability of C querying with ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the UN-CLGSC stage, the probability of C refuging the right ciphertext is less than q UnÀCLGSC =2 k . In conjunction with the multiple forking lemma, 48 the EC-DL problem can be solved with probability e 0 ø eÁ Theorem 4 (Type II unforgeability). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary A II with a nonnegligible advantage e against the EUF-CLGSC-CMA-II security of the scheme running in signature or signcryption mode in time t and performing at most q H i H i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) queries, q pÀk private-key queries, q CLGSC CLGSC queries, and q UnÀCLGSC Un-CLGSC queries, then the EC-DL problem can be solved with probability e 0 ø e Á 1=q 
is not the output of a CLGSC query, according to the general forking lemma, 49 we can obtain two valid signatures
2 ), where h 2 ) À1 = a. Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Forgery stage, the probability of ID Ã A = ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the private-key query, the probability of C querying with ID l is 1=q H 1 . In the UN-CLGSC stage, the probability of C refuging the right ciphertext is less than q UnÀCLGSC =2 k . In conjunction with the general forking lemma, 49 the EC-DL problem can be solved with probability e 0 ø e Á 1=q H 1 Á (1 À 1=q H 1 ) qpÀk Á (1 À q UnÀCLGSC =2 k )Á (e=q H 2 À 1=2 k ). In terms of time complexity, CLGSC and Un-CLGSC queries need 5 and 7 t m computations, respectively.
Note 1: A II is allowed to query the full private key S have linear relationships, so the general forking lemma is applicable to this scenario.
Efficiency
We compare our scheme with other CLGSC schemes, including the schemes of Zhang et al., 3 Zhou et al., 7 and Zhou et al., 46 with the time-consuming computations taken into account. The comparison results are listed in Table 1 . The symbols p, e, m 1 , and m 2 denote a pairing computation, an exponentiation computation on G 2 , a pairing-based scalar multiplication computation on G 1 , and an elliptic curve cryptography-based (ecc-based) scalar multiplication computation on G 1 , respectively. jG 1 j, jG 2 j, jqj, jmj, and jIDj represent the bit lengths of an element on G 1 , G 2 , z Ã q , a message m, and an identity, respectively. From Table 1 , we can see that our scheme requires one more m 2 computation than scheme [3] in the CLGSC and Un-CLGSC stage, respectively, and is jqj bit longer than scheme [3] in the ciphertext size. In order to improve the security of scheme [3] , ours increases the computational costs, but only slightly. And, compared with other pairing-based schemes, our scheme proves to be excellent.
To show the comparisons more directly, we use the MIRACL library 50 to test the runtime of the basic cryptographic operations. The average runtime is listed in Table 2 (we tested it 1000 times). The experiment was run on a Windows 7 Home Basic 64-bit Operating System. The hardware consists of an Intel Core i7-4510U CPU running at 2.0 GHz with 8 GB of memory. For pairing-based schemes, we use the supersingular elliptic curve E=F p : y 2 = x 3 À 3x with an embedding degree of 2, where q is a 160-bit Solinas prime q = 2 159 + 2 17 + 1 and p a 512-bit prime satisfying p + 1 = 2qh. Its security level is equivalent to 1024-bit RSA. To achieve the same security level, for ecc-based schemes, we use secp160r1, as recommended by the Certicom Corporation. 51 When we adopt the above parameters, for pairingbased schemes, jG 1 j = jG 2 j = 1024|, jqj = 160, and for ecc-based schemes, jG 1 j = 320, jqj = 160. Let jmj = 160 and jIDj = 160. We can obtain Table 3 by combining  Tables 1 and 2 .
From Table 3 , we can see that scheme [3] is (4:85 À 3:88)=4:85 = 20% faster than ours in the [33] (n + 3w + 2)m 1 + e (w + 3)p + wm 1 + we (n + 2w + 2)|G 1 | + |G 2 | + |q| + |ID| [34] (n + w + 1)m 1 + e (w + 2)p + nm 1 + we (n + w + 1)|G 1 | + |G 2 | + |q| + |ID| [35] p + (n + 3)m 1 + e 3p + nm 1 (n + 2)|G 1 | + |m| [36] 4m 2 5m 2 |G 1 | + |q| + 2|m| Ours 5m 2 7m 2 2|G 1 | + |q| + |m| SC: signcryption. w and n represent the number of attributes and the number of elements in the ring, respectively. 
